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The growth, development and institutionalisation of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) processes in Australia have paved the way for a changing 
legal culture. Whilst the adversarial process underpins the Australian legal 
system, the theory and practice of ADR has allowed a broadening of 
attitudes towards conflict resolution. In Victoria, collaborative rather than 
adversarial approaches to justice have been put into practice in ‘problem-
solving courts’. This development evidences an institutional shift from 
adversarial justice towards the greater inclusion of non-adversarial dispute 
resolution processes. Contemporary best practice lawyering demands 
recognition and acceptance of this change. Legal educators and regulators 
must also act on the new reality of lawyering. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In concluding his second reading of the Legal Profession Bill to the Victorian 
Legislative Assembly on 16 November 2004, the Attorney-General, Robert 
Hulls, quoted Robert F Kennedy as follows: 
Just because we cannot see clearly the end of the road, that is no reason for 
not setting out on the essential journey. On the contrary, great change 
dominates the world, and unless we move with change we will become its 
victims.1
Mr Hulls used the quotation to illustrate how the changes made by the Bill to 
the regulation and business structures pertaining to the legal profession are 
forward looking, yet the market for legal services may change in the future. 
The Attorney-General’s remarks and those of Robert Kennedy are cogent as 
they highlight both the need for change and the reality of change. The 
 
                                                 
* Lecturer, La Trobe Law, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria. The author wishes to thank 
Dennis Warren, Kathy Douglas and the anonymous referee for comments on this article. 
1 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 November 2004, 1549. 
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comments also draw attention to the necessity for legal practitioners to 
recognise change, adjust to change and accept its uncertainty. 
In recognition of positive moves towards non-adversarial methods of conflict 
resolution overseas, Mr Hulls noted that ‘[w]e need to think smart when it 
comes to attempting to solve disputes, and the courts should be a place of last 
resort’.2 This comment underscores the Victorian government commitment to 
ADR,3 as evidenced by the May 2008 multimillion dollar State budget 
package aimed at positive initiatives in dealing with the 3.3 million disputes 
in Victoria each year. Strategies for improving dispute resolution services 
include expansion of mediation programs in all jurisdictions, including the 
Supreme Court of Victoria and the County Court of Victoria, and upgrading 
ADR facilities in regional Victoria.4
This article discusses recent shifts of direction in the theory and practice of 
law. It identifies the starting point for transformation as the ADR movement, 
and examines the various trends in lawyering and the legal institutions that 
have developed as a result of ADR practice. Broadly put, the changes 
considered in this article reflect ‘collaboration and connection rather than 
adversarialism and separation’.
 The comment also suggests that 
adjudicative court process should be a last resort for conflict resolution, 
because legalism fails to take into account the needs and interests of 
disputants. Disputes originating within the substantive context of human 
relations, are translated, by legal rules and court procedures, into generic 
categories of rights, entitlements and duties. This process can be a deficient 
conflict resolution mechanism because it effaces what is human in disputing - 
the needs and interests, values, beliefs and commitments of the participants.   
5
                                                 
2 Melissa Fyfe, ‘Judgement Day Looms for Overloaded Legal System’, The Sunday  
  
Age, (Melbourne) 4 May 2008, 11. 
3 The National Alternative Dispute Advisory Committee (NADRAC), in its Dispute Resolution 
Terms (2003) 4, defines ADR as ‘an umbrella term for processes, other than judicial 
determination, in which an impartial person assists those in a dispute to resolve the issues 
between them’. 
4 Although scholars such as Tania Sourdin advance the idea that mediation defies codification 
(see Tania Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution (3rd ed, 2008) 52), NADRAC in 2003 
defined mediation as ‘a process in which parties to a dispute with the assistance of a neutral 
third party (the mediator), identify disputed issues, develop options, consider alternatives and 
endeavour to reach agreement. The mediator has no advisory or determinative role in regard to 
the content of the dispute or the outcome of its resolution, but may advise on or determine the 
process of mediation whereby resolution is attempted.’ See NADRAC above n 3, 9. The 
NADRAC definition underlies a facilitative model of mediation although other models 
(evaluative, settlement, therapeutic, transformative) exist.  
5 Michael King, ‘What Can Mainstream Courts Learn From Problem-Solving Courts?’ (2007) 
32(2) Alternative Law Journal 91, 95.   
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II LEGAL EDUCATION 
 
The foundation for change in the way lawyers practise law can often be traced 
back to values and models of lawyering transmitted to law students in law 
schools. 
Since the naissance of clinical legal education programmes in 1981, and their 
subsequent receipt of Commonwealth government funding,6 practice-based 
courses have grown in Australian university curricula, in keeping with the 
notion that a law school must teach more than theory.7 A good legal education 
should also teach students what lawyers actually do in practice.8 The 
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), referring to the MacCrate 
Report,9 advocates the ‘hands on’ approach to legal education and recognises 
that the ‘emerging trend in Australia has been toward the teaching of generic 
“professional skills” – that is, skills which will be needed in any subsequent 
legal practice, but would be equally valuable in a range of other occupations 
and professions’.10 Consequently, ALRC Recommendation 2 states that ‘[i]n 
addition to the study of core areas of substantive law, university legal 
education in Australia should involve the development of high level 
professional skills and a deep appreciation of ethical standards’.11
The ALRC recommendation underscores the unbreakable link between 
professional skills, professional ethics and professional responsibilities. 
Whilst the ALRC view is based on a resources argument, it also recognises 
the importance of non-adversarial forms of dispute resolution in contemporary 
Australian legal practice. The ALRC perspective on legal education presents 
an interesting interface with the multi-disciplinary approach of problem 
solving courts, the various skills sets that lawyers practising in these courts 
are required to possess, and the complex range of ethical and professional 
responsibility matters that arise in non-adversarial legal practice. These 
interrelated issues are discussed below. 
 
                                                 
6 Mary Anne Noone and Stephen A Tomsen, Lawyers in Conflict (2006) 208-209. 
7 Mary Anne Noone and Judith Dickson, ‘Teaching Towards a New Professionalism: 
Challenging Law Students to Become Ethical Lawyers’ (2004) 4 Legal Ethics 127, 127.   
8 Judy Gutman, Tom Fisher and Erica Martens, ‘Teaching ADR to Australian Law Students: 
Implications for Legal Practice in Australia’ (2008) 19 Australasian Dispute Resolution 
Journal 42, 45. 
9 American Bar Association Legal Education and Professional Development, An Educational 
Continuum (Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap) 
(1992) cited in Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the 
Federal Civil Justice System Report 89 (2000) [2.20] and [2.21]. 
10 Ibid [2.19]. 
11 Ibid [2.89]. 
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More recently, the Carnegie Report12 and the Best Practices for Legal 
Education document,13 both emanating from the United States, endorsed the 
ALRC position, concluding that best practice legal education involves more 
than teaching substantive law subjects and problem-solving techniques aimed 
at training law students to ‘think like lawyers’. Traditional knowledge of the 
law is important, but so too is the development of legal skills that encourage 
students to be mindful individuals,14
Currently, most law schools teach ADR as part of the law school 
curriculum,
 capable of exercising good judgment, 
guided by solid ethical principles and committed to professional 
responsibilities. 
15 although the impact of the collaborative problem-solving 
approach taught in ADR units is normally overshadowed by what Riskin 
terms the ‘lawyers’ standard philosophical map’ underpinned by the 
adversarial model taught in most ‘black letter’ law subjects.16 New directions 
in legal education point to the humanisation of the discipline with ‘human 
nature as the new guiding philosophy’17 underscored by Justice Cardozo’s 
mantra ‘love the law, and treat it as an honourable profession’.18
Changes in legal education pave the way for new trends in legal practice. 
These developments include a move away from adversarial approaches to 
justice and a move towards non-adversarial strategies, transfers from a rights 
and legal entitlements model to a paradigm that values stakeholders’ 
underlying interests, de-emphasising lawyer intervention and stressing client 
empowerment, eliminating narrow legalism and embracing a holistic and 
interdisciplinary problem-solving approach to law. The trends and practices 
examined in this article herald the present track of Australian legal practice 
which, as Daicoff aptly argues, seeks to harness the ‘rights plus’ potential of 
law and law’s inherent ability to act as an agent for constructive change, both 
 
                                                 
12 William M Sullivan et al, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession (2007). 
13 Roy Stuckey et al, Best Practices for Legal Education (2007).  
14 Craig Hassed et al, ‘Enhancing the Health of Medical Students: Outcomes of an Integrated 
Mindfulness and Lifestyle Program’ (2008) Advances in Health Science Education: Theory and 
Practice <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10459-008-9125-3> at 7 February 2009. 
15 See Judy Gutman, Tom Fisher and Erika Martens, ‘Why Teach Alternative Dispute 
Resolution to Law Students? Part One: Past and Current Practices and Some Unanswered 
Questions’ (2006) 16 Legal Education Review 125, 136. 
16 Leonard Riskin, ‘Disseminating the Missouri Plan to Integrate Dispute Resolution into 
Standard Law School Courses’ (1998) 50 Florida Law Review 590, 607. 
17 Lawrence S Krieger, ‘Human Nature as a New Guiding Philosophy for Legal Education and 
the Profession’ (2008) 47(2) Washburn Law Journal 247, 247.  
18 Paula A Franzese, ‘The Good Lawyer; Choosing to Believe in the Promise of our Craft’ in 
Marjorie A Silver The Affective Assistance of Counsel (2007) 513, 514 quoting Justice 
Cardozo’s advice to the first graduating class of New York University Law School. 
   2009                                                                                    Non-Adversarial Justice 
 
 
 
33 
33 
for individuals and the community.19 The contours of the new legal practice 
landscape add yet another facet to legal professional responsibility. According 
to MacFarlane, the ‘evolution of legal practice’ values litigation but privileges 
ADR.20 The role of the ‘new lawyer’ is not limited to the traditional functions 
of officer of the court and client champion; it extends to encompass that of 
conflict resolution advocate.21 These developments signal an era where both 
legal practitioner22
 
 and client satisfaction are expected to increase and where 
positive outcomes for dispute stakeholders and the administration of justice 
are promoted  
III THE ASCENDANCY OF ADR 
 
Non-curial methods of dealing with conflict have been described since 
biblical times.23 Astor and Chinkin argue that what we now label as ADR has 
for a long time been the dominant method of resolving disputes worldwide, 
originating as a tribal customary method of resolving conflict.24 Without 
challenging the historicity of ADR, judicial determination of disputes, 
according to rules of evidence and procedure, has been the conventional mode 
of conflict resolution in western cultures in modern times. Because of this 
tradition, dispute resolution processes outside the courts have been perceived 
as innovative and labelled as ‘alternative’.25
                                                 
19 Susan Daicoff, ‘Law as a Healing Profession: The Comprehensive Law Movement’ (2006) 6 
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 1, 4. 
 However, this perception of ADR 
processes as ‘alternative’ can now be challenged because of the 
mainstreaming of ADR processes such as mediation, conciliation, arbitration 
and conferencing, which are all accepted dispute resolution processes within, 
outside and beside the formal legal system. In the contemporary context, it is 
20 Julie Macfarlane The New Lawyer; How Settlement is Transforming the Practice of Law 
(2008) 16. 
21 Ibid 22. 
22 Michael King ‘Exploring the Therapeutic Scope of Jurisprudence’ (2006) 80(5) Law Institute 
Journal 48, 51. Kathy Douglas, ‘Steering Through Troubled Waters’ (2007) 81(5) Law Institute 
Journal 30, 31. 
23 Robert Baruch Bush, ‘Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: an 
Imaginary Conversation’ (1989-1990) 3 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 1, 17.  
24 Hilary Astor and Christine Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia (2nd ed, 2002) 5. 
25 See Gutman, Fisher and Martens, above n 15, 126. 
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more fitting and realistic that the A in ADR now stand for ‘assisted,’ 
‘adjunct’, ‘additional’ or ‘appropriate’ rather than ‘alternative’.26
The entrenched and accepted nature of ADR processes within most Australian 
jurisdictions, both at inferior and superior court levels is indisputable, but the 
reasons for the rapid, unfaltering growth and favourable reception of ADR 
within legal institutions are not entirely clear. There are several plausible 
explanations for the rise of ADR. The first is based on criticisms of the 
adversarial adjudication system. Court backlogs lead to frustrating delays in 
hearings. Litigation is time consuming, anxiety-producing and very 
expensive.
  
27
Often, litigants who feel that they do not ‘own’ their disputes experience 
feelings of alienation and powerlessness.
 Reliance on procedural and evidentiary rules confines disputes to 
narrow legal parameters, ignoring the human element of most disputes. Layers 
of legal positions can often be peeled back to reveal disputants’ needs, wants, 
and concerns that do not necessarily fit into the confines of legally accepted 
categories of disputing.  
28 Stakeholder dissatisfaction with 
the litigation process and litigated outcomes is rife and justified.29 Similarly, 
in the criminal justice context, both victims and offenders are dissatisfied with 
the traditional criminal justice paradigm. Moreover, the narrow rights-based 
framework does not address the complex social context of crime. Sentencing 
options such as incarceration do not necessarily reduce recidivism.30
Another reason for ADR’s success derives from the inherent strengths of 
ADR processes. In contrast to litigation, ADR is cheap, quick and encourages 
stakeholders to participate in the process, these factors leading to increased 
stakeholder satisfaction. Bush and Folger refer to the ‘satisfaction story’
 Whilst, 
theoretically, one aim of the criminal law may be to rehabilitate offenders, this 
goal cannot be achieved by sentencing options that do not address the 
multifaceted nature of criminality.  
31 of 
ADR - namely that due to ‘… its flexibility, informality … consensuality…’32
                                                 
26 Sourdin, above n 4, 3. Interestingly, the Victorian Attorney General, Mr Hulls refers to ADR 
as ‘appropriate dispute resolution’. See Jason Gregory, ‘Changing the Face of Justice’ (2008) 
82(12) Law Institute Journal 18, 18. 
 
27 See David Rood, ‘Justice out of Reach, says Hulls’, The Age (Melbourne) 10 June 2008, 1.  
28 See Nils Christie, ‘Conflicts as Property’ (1977) 17 British Journal of Criminology 1, 1. 
29 See John Kleinig, Ethics and Criminal Justice (2008) 208. 
30 Richard Edney and Mirko Bagaric, Australian Sentencing Principles and Practice (2007) 45. 
31 Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger, The Promise of Mediation (revised ed, 2005) 9. 
32 Ibid. 
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and non-reliance on legal rules, ADR can expand the parameters of a dispute 
and satisfy the human needs associated with conflict and disputing.33
The foregoing explanations for the growth of ADR processes underpin a third 
and, arguably, the most important reason for ADR’s successful incorporation 
into the legal system, namely judicial and government support. For example, 
the ‘Report of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court’s Policy and Planning 
Committee on Court Annexed Mediation’ stated:  
  
Mediation is much cheaper than litigation … It has been said that the 
mediation of a commercial dispute by the Australian Commercial Disputes 
Centre costs 5% of the costs of litigating or arbitrating the same matter.34
Similarly, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Victoria, John 
Harber Phillips, endorsed ADR as follows:  
   
It should be stressed that mediation is not an inferior type of justice. It is a 
different type of justice. All studies of dispute resolution show that people 
greatly value quick resolution of disputes and the opportunity to put their 
case in the presence of a neutral person. Mediation satisfies both these 
requirements.35
The importance of ADR within the Australian legal framework is recognised 
by former Chief Justice Gleeson of the High Court in his ‘State of the 
Judicature’ address: 
 
Both within and outside the court system, there is an increased emphasis on 
various forms of alternative dispute resolution. Arbitration has long been an 
important alternative to litigation, and has certain advantages, especially as a 
form of resolution of commercial disputes. Other procedures, such as 
mediation, conciliation, and early neutral evaluation, are also widely used. 
The courts have never had the capacity to resolve by judicial decision all, or 
even most, of the civil cases that are brought to them. Most legal disputes 
never come before courts; and most court cases are resolved by agreement 
between the parties rather than judicial decision.36
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
 
34 New South Wales Chief Justice's Policy and Planning Committee Subcommittee on Court 
Annexed Mediation,  Report of the Chief Justice's Policy and Planning Subcommittee on Court 
Annexed Mediation (1991). 
35Supreme Court of Victoria, Mediation (2007) 
<http://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/Supreme+Court/Home/Support+Servi
ces/Mediation/> at 7 February 2009.  
36 Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, State of the Judicature, Presented at the 35th Australian Legal 
Convention (Sydney, 25 March 2007), 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_25mar07.pdf> at 20 January 2008. 
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The government response to ADR at both State and federal level mirrors the 
judicial comments above. The Commonwealth government promotes the role 
of Family Dispute Resolution Practitioners in the new and widely distributed 
Family Relationship Centres (FRCs),37 as well as in the practice of 
collaborative law within the Family Court of Australia.38 Best practice in both 
areas regards litigation as a last resort unless special circumstances obtain. 
Section 601 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) mandates lawyers to advise 
clients to attend family dispute resolution prior to the commencement of 
litigation and requires disputing parents to attend family dispute resolution 
and make a bona fide attempt to resolve the dispute.39
The FRCs emphasise mediation, conciliation and counselling rather than 
litigation. They focus on the interests of affected children and on the parties’ 
shared goals. Other key elements are the voluntary and free exchange of 
information, interest-based negotiation, legal advice directed towards speedy, 
cost-contained, fair and just outcomes for both parties, and a commitment to 
the best interests of children.
 
40
The grafting of ADR onto the family law mainstream process coincided with 
the use of ADR processes in other areas of law such as environmental law, 
discrimination law and industrial law. Soon after this, statutory schemes and 
tribunals adopted ADR to increase their repertoire of dispute resolution 
methods.
  
41
Robertson and Giddings make the point that currently there is a shift in 
Australia towards clients (consumers) contributing to the provision of their 
  
                                                 
37Attorney-General’s Department, Family Dispute Resolution (2008) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(4341200FE1255EFC59DB7A1770C1D
0A5)~family-dispute-resolution.DOC/$file/family-dispute-resolution.DOC> at 20 January 
2008. 
38 Family Law Council Sub-Committee for Consultation, Draft Best Guidelines for 
Collaborative Family Law Practice (2006) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(89F1F6C871DBA8C45DA2DCE598C
20BF8)~DRAFT+guidelines+for+consultation+(June+2006).pdf/$file/DRAFT+guidelines+for
+consultation+(June+2006).pdf> at 24 February 2009. See also, Donna Cooper, ‘The Family 
Dispute Resolution Spectrum’ (2007) 18 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 234, 234. 
See also, Anne Ardagh and Guy Cumes, ‘The Legal Profession Post-ADR: From Mediation to 
Collaborative Law’ (2007) 18 Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 205, 209. 
39 Linda Fisher and Mieke Brandon, Mediating with Families (2nd ed, 2009) 13.   
40 See Ardagh and Cumes, above n 38, 209. 
41 David Purnell, ‘Mediation Theory and Practice: A Practitioner’s Reflections on 
Developments in Mediation’ (2005) 7(10) ADR Bulletin 183, 184. 
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own legal services,42 and that this trend is transforming legal service 
delivery.43 For example, the authors note the Family Court of Australia’s 
promotion of mediation44 and the ‘unbundling’ of the legal full-service 
delivery model.45
Although Robertson and Corbin describe the dynamic between lawyer and 
client as ‘the client delegator seeking the lawyer reliever’,
 Including the client’s input in the legal service undermines 
the lawyer’s control but empowers the client.  
46 the authors 
recognise a variety of permutations and combinations of lawyer and client 
characteristics that alter the passive/active hypothesis.47 In addition, the 
authors note from their empirical study a strong belief among lawyers that 
clients should be involved in decision making, particularly regarding 
settlement issues.48 The finding is consistent with professional conduct rules 
that require legal practitioners to assist clients in understanding the issues 
pertaining to their case, thereby enabling clients to give proper instructions, 
particularly in connection with any compromise of the case.49
Recent comments by the Commonwealth Attorney-General, Robert 
McClelland, suggesting an end to native title litigation, signpost the Federal 
Government’s preference for collaborative processes to resolve land and 
ownership issues. Processes such as negotiation and mediation are considered 
by the government to be preferable to current practices in the area, which 
centre on narrow legalistic approaches involving multimillion dollar court 
hearings and expensive expert reports.
 
50 The Attorney-General suggests 
interest-based negotiation as the starting point for native title claims instead of 
existing procedures which begin with an expert report pertaining to the 
claimants’ connection to the land.51
                                                 
42 Michael Robertson and Jeff Giddings, ‘Legal Consumers as Coproducers: The Changing 
Face of Legal Service Delivery in Australia’ (2002) 40 Family Court Review 63, 63. 
 In describing the way forward for native 
43 Ibid 64. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid. Robertson and Giddings adopt Mosten’s description of ‘unbundled legal services’ 
whereby clients ‘can be in charge of selecting from lawyers’ services only a portion of the full 
package and contracting with the lawyer accordingly’. 
46 Michael Robertson and Lillian Corbin, ‘To Enable or to Relive? Specialist Lawyers’ 
Perceptions of Client Involvement in Legal Service Delivery’ (2005) 12(1) International 
Journal of the Legal Profession 121, 140. 
47 Ibid 121. 
48 Ibid 122. 
49 See, eg, Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2005 (Vic) r 12.2. 
50 Nicola Berkovic, ‘End Native Title Litigation, Says A-G’ The Australian (Sydney), 7 March 
2008, 30. Attorney-General the Hon Robert McClelland (Speech delivered at the Negotiating 
Native Title Forum, Brisbane, 29 February 2008) 14. 
51 Ibid 34. 
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title claims, Mr McClelland asserts that improved outcomes would emerge 
from avoiding the ‘winner takes all’52 results derived from adversarial judicial 
proceedings and ‘…resolving land use and ownership issues through 
negotiation, because negotiation produces broader and better outcomes than 
litigation’.53
The Attorney-General’s remarks highlight the ‘zero-sum game’
 
54 
characteristic of the traditional adversarial contest, as well as the nature of 
lawyers’ work in the adversary system. In litigation, one side’s gain 
necessarily means a loss for the other side.55 It is argued that academic and 
professional training56 and practice in competitive legal work, combined with 
lawyers’ personality traits57 and the overarching goal of winning, reduce the 
ability of lawyers to empathise with clients. This promotes chronic negative 
emotional responses in lawyers such as demoralisation, anxiety, anger, and 
sadness,58 which lead to marital problems, mental illness and substance 
abuse.59 These factors compound to damage lawyers’ health and well being 
and also foster low public opinion of the legal profession.60
The importance of lawyers to the operation of the legal process is recognised 
by the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic). The Victorian Attorney-General, in 
the second reading speech of the Bill, described the legal profession as being 
the ‘principal source of legal assistance’ and therefore as playing ‘an 
important role in the way justice and the rule of law are delivered and 
perceived’.
 This negatively 
impacts on the workings and administration of the justice system. 
61
                                                 
52 Ibid 22. 
 Mr McClelland’s preference for negotiation over litigation 
should be based not only on the positive results achieved for dispute 
stakeholders and the community, but also on transformations to lawyers’ well-
53 Ibid 26. 
54 Martin E P Seligman, Paul R Verkuil and Terry H Kang, ‘Why Lawyers are Unhappy’ 
(2005) 10(1) Deakin Law Review 49, 60. 
55 Ibid 61. 
56 Riskin describes the traditional adversarial training in the black letter law subjects as the 
‘lawyer’s standard philosophical map’. See Leonard L Riskin, ‘Awareness in Lawyering: A 
Primer on Paying Attention’ in Marjorie A Silver, The Affective Assistance of Counsel (2007) 
47, 47. For a discussion on teaching ADR in law schools, see Gutman, above n 15, 136. 
57 Susan Daicoff, ‘Lawyer Personality Traits and their Relationship to Various Approaches to 
Lawyering’ in Marjorie A Silver, The Affective Assistance of Counsel (2007) 79, 80. 
58 Seligman above n 54, 61. 
59 Daicoff, above n 19, 56; Michael Hunter Schwartz, ‘Humanizing Legal Education: An 
Introduction to a Symposium Whose Time Came’ (2008) 47 Washburn Law Journal 235, 235. 
60 Daicoff, above n 19, 56. 
61 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 November 2004, 1541 (Robert 
Hulls, Attorney-General). 
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being resulting from job satisfaction derived from non-adversarial practice,62
 
 
which may have positive outcomes for the administration of justice. 
IV VICTORIAN INITIATIVES 
 
The Victorian Law Reform Commission, in its draft summary of civil justice 
reform proposals,63 suggests legislative intervention to increase active judicial 
case management by ‘encouraging disputing parties to use an alternative 
dispute resolution procedure if the Court considers that appropriate and 
facilitating the use of such procedure’.64 In keeping with this proposal, 
Victorian government policy concerning the acceptance of ADR theory and 
practice is similar to that of the Federal Government, as evidenced by the 
therapeutic65 and restorative jurisprudential approaches taken in problem-
solving courts throughout the State. Problem-solving courts ‘seek to use the 
authority of the courts to address the underlying problems of individual 
litigants, the structural problems of the justice system and the social problems 
of communities’.66 The consensus-seeking model67 is endorsed by the 
Victorian Government in the Attorney-General’s Justice Statement 2,68 where 
the promotion of ADR is seen as the way ahead for legal services delivery in 
Victoria because of ADR’s ability to ‘minimise costs, maintain relationships 
and “truly resolve disputes rather than just have them determined”.’69
According to Mr Hulls’ comments at the March 2007 Restorative Justice 
forum, the growing emphasis on specialisation across various jurisdictions - 
for example the Sexual Assault List in the County Court of Victoria - 
‘demonstrates our collective acknowledgement that we must infuse greater 
compassion and understanding of the human experience into the arid air of the 
court’.
 
70
                                                 
62 Daicoff, above n 19, 56. 
 It appears that the Victorian Attorney-General is not only looking at 
the practical advantages of non-adversarial justice such as cost and time 
63 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Civil Justice - Second Exposure Draft (2007). 
64 Ibid [1.2.1].  
65 King, above n 22, 51.  
66 Arie Freiberg, ‘Managerialism in Australian Criminal Justice; RIP for KPIs?’ (2005) 31(1) 
Monash University Law Review 12, 35.  
67 Macfarlane, above n 20, 188. 
68 Robert Hulls, Attorney-General’s Justice Statement 2 - October 2008 (2008). 
69 Gregory, above n 26, 18. 
70 Workshop 1, Talking Justice Forum, 21 March 2007, Neighbourhood Justice Centre, 
Collingwood. See also Rood, above n 27, 1. 
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savings and decreased court backlogs. His support for specialist problem-
solving courts is also based on an appreciation of the human costs of litigation 
and the strong link between legal and social issues. As Sir Anthony Mason 
remarked,  
to treat the law as a discrete set of principles in a vacuum and without a 
context is to misconceive its dynamic and ubiquitous nature and, more 
importantly, to undervalue or even to overlook the manner in which it 
contributes to the fundamental fabric of modern society.71
Problem-solving courts rely on principles of restorative justice theory and 
therapeutic jurisprudence, the two movements sharing similar approaches to 
victims and offenders.
 
72 Notwithstanding that the term ‘restorative justice’ 
may be difficult to define,73 Umbreit describes the core of restorative justice 
as: elevating victim and community participation in crime response; holding 
offenders accountable to victims; restoring losses; promoting dialogue 
between victims, offenders, family and community; encouraging offenders to 
take responsibility for their acts; persuading offenders to make amends; and 
facilitating offender up-skilling and reintegration into society.74 Group 
conferencing is the most common restorative justice process.75 The model 
emerged in the 1980s76 and was the prototype adopted by Anglicare in 
devising the first Victorian Family Group Conferencing pilot in 1995.77 The 
program was expanded to country and metropolitan services in 2003.78
The kernel of Wexler’s definition of therapeutic jurisprudence focuses on the 
role of law as a therapeutic agent, rather than on the anti-therapeutic impact of 
court decisions.
 
79
                                                 
71 Sir Anthony Mason, Chief Justice of Australia, 19 February 1991, at the Inauguration of the 
Law Faculty, University of Wollongong, quoted in Stephen Bottomley and Simon Bronitt, Law 
in Context (3rd ed 2006) 2.  
 Within the parameters set by principles of justice, law needs 
72 Arie Freiberg, ‘Non-Adversarial Approaches to Criminal Justice’ (2007) 16 Journal of 
Judicial Administration 205, 214. 
73 Clare Cappa, ‘The Social, Political and Theoretical Context of Drug Courts’ (2006) 32(1) 
Monash University Law Review 145, 165.  
74 Mark Umbreit, The Handbook of Victim Offender Mediation (2001) 306. 
75 Douglas, above n 22, 32. See also Lawrence Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Processes, 
Practice (2nd ed, 2005) 127-8. 
76 Peter Condliffe, ‘Putting the Pieces Together: the Opportunity for Restorative Justice in 
Victoria’ (2005) 79(8) Law Institute Journal 54, 55. 
77 Peter Condliffe, Victim Offender Dispute Resolution Manual (2004) 21. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Douglas, above n 22. 
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to be constructed to serve more effectively as a therapeutic driving force80 that 
assists in clients’ overall wellbeing.81
Douglas remarks on the rapid introduction of problem-solving courts into 
Victoria,
 
82 which can be explained by qualitative and quantitative evidence 
showing that therapeutic and restorative paradigms of justice have led to 
many benefits, including promotion of participant wellbeing,83 reduced 
recidivism,84 decreased costs and increased compliance with court orders.85 
The non-adversarial model, when used in the criminal law context, also 
provides both victim and offender with more satisfaction than the mainstream 
criminal justice system.86 Harris describes the sentencing process in Victorian 
Koori Courts as ‘sentencing conversations’. In stark contrast to sentencing in 
traditional Magistrates’ Courts, ‘Koori Courts have created a space where the 
stories behind the offences can be told and the important part of community in 
the life of the defendant can be recognised’.87 This empowering ‘satisfaction 
story’ may also be due to the rejection, by problem-solving courts, of the ‘one 
size fits all’ approach taken by mainstream courts in applying rules of 
evidence and procedure in an adversarial context. Freiberg cogently explains 
the interface between problem-solving courts and therapeutic justice as ‘the 
integration of treatment services with judicial case processing, ongoing 
judicial intervention, close monitoring of and immediate response to 
behaviour, multi-disciplinary involvement, and collaboration with community 
based, and government organizations’.88
                                                 
80 David Wexler, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts’ (1993) 35 William and 
Mary Law Review 279, 280. 
 
81 Douglas, above n 22. 
82 Ibid.  
83 King, above n 5. 
84 See, eg, Mark Harris, “A sentencing conversation”: Evaluation of the Koori Courts: Pilot 
Program: October 2002 - October 2004 (2006) at Department of Justice 
<http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/DOJ+Internet/resources/file/ebb369085925f8
7/Evaluation_of_the_Koori_Courts_Pilot_Program.pdf > at 9 February 2009. This provides 
data relating to reduced levels of recidivism among Koori defendants who were sentenced in 
Victorian Koori Courts. 
85 King, above n 5.  
86 See Lawrence Sherman and Heather Strang, Restorative Justice: The Evidence (2007) The 
Smith Institute <http://www.smith-institute.org.uk/pdfs/RJ_full_report.pdf> at 9 February 
2009; see also Heather Strang et al, ‘Victim Evaluations of Face-to Face Restorative Justice 
Conferences: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis’ (2006) 62(2) Journal of Social Issues 281, 281. 
87 Harris, above n 85, 14. 
88 Arie Freiberg ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Australia; Paradigm Shift or Pragmatic 
Incrementalism?’ (2003) 20(2) Law In Context 6, 11. 
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Even though the first problem-solving court established in Victoria - the 
Children’s Court - was created in 1906, it was not until early in the twenty 
first century that most of Victoria’s problem-solving courts were set up. 
Examples are the Dandenong Drug Court (2002), the Koori Court (2002), the 
Koori Children’s Court (2005), the Family Violence Court (2005)89 and the 
Collingwood Neighbourhood Justice Centre (2007).90 The last of these is a 
multi-jurisdictional court, committed to providing simplified access to the 
justice system and applying therapeutic justice and restorative justice 
philosophies to the administration of justice.91 The Collingwood 
Neighbourhood Justice Centre was the first type of court of its kind to be 
opened in Australia.92
Historically, all problem-solving courts in Victoria were specialist 
Magistrates’ Courts. The status quo changed in November 2008 with the 
establishment of a pilot program for a Koori County Court, another Australian 
first,
 
93
 
 which sentences indigenous offenders, after a finding of guilt, for 
serious offences excluding sexual offences, in a setting and environment that 
is culturally sensitive to their aboriginality, and using non-adversarial justice 
principles. 
V IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL PRACTICE 
 
Although traditional alternative dispute resolution practices such as 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration, can and often do involve practitioners 
from a variety of disciplines, lawyers play a key role for several reasons. The 
first reason touches on aspects of a legal practitioner’s professional 
obligations. Lawyers, in their client advocate role,94
                                                 
89 Magistrates' Court of Victoria, Family Violence Court Division 
<
 negotiate settlements of 
http://www.magistratescourt.vic.gov.au/CA256CD30010D864/page/Specialist+Court+Jurisdi
ctions-Family+Violence+Court+Division?OpenDocument&1=40-
Specialist+Court+Jurisdictions~&2=50-Family+Violence+Court+Division~&3=~> at 9 
February 2009. 
90 See Courts Legislation (Neighbourhood Justice Centre) Act 2006 (Vic) s 1. See also David 
Fanning, ‘Neighbourhood Justice’ (2007) 81(3) Law Institute Journal 26, 26. 
91 See Courts Legislation (Neighbourhood Justice Centre) Act 2006 (Vic) s 1. 
92 See Fanning, above n 91, 26, and Douglas, above n 22, 31. 
93 Carol Nader, ‘Koori Court won’t Hear Sex Charges’ The Age (Melbourne), 6 May 2008, 6. 
94 See, eg, Ian Ramsay, ‘Ethical Perspectives on the Practice of Business Law’ (1992) 30(5) 
Law Society Journal 60, 61; Christine Parker, ‘A Critical Morality for Lawyers: Four 
Approaches to Lawyers’ Ethics’ (2004) 30 Monash University Law Review 49, 56. 
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disputes as champions of their clients’ legal positions.95 Whilst the duty of 
lawyers to advocate their clients’ viewpoints and act in their clients’ best 
interests is irrefutable, lawyers also have an ethical responsibility to act as 
officers of the court in furtherance of the integrity of the legal process. The 
legal practitioner’s duty to put the client’s case in its most favourable light96 is 
tempered by the practitioner’s higher duty to the court which requires the 
practitioner to independently exercise forensic judgments.97
Dal Pont suggests that by proposing ADR to a client, lawyers are acting out 
their role as officers of the court,
 The duality of 
these duties, played out in mainstream adjudicative court processes, creates an 
ethical tension for many practitioners. 
98 because ADR is perceived as a positive 
streamlining, cost-cutting mechanism, assisting the efficiency of the court 
infrastructure with conflict resolution management.99 Whilst this notion is 
consistent with MacFarlane’s idea of the ‘new lawyer’ who is committed 
philosophically and pragmatically to conflict resolution,100
Whether advising clients on ADR is based on a lawyer’s duty to act in the 
clients’ best interests or on their duty to the legal system, it is clear that 
negotiating settlements on behalf of clients and advising clients on how to 
settle matters without resorting to litigation is part of current best legal 
practice. 
 the concept also 
raises the potential for conflict with the traditional role of the lawyer as 
zealous champion of the client’s legal rights and positions. 
Spencer asserts that it is a component of legal professional responsibility for 
lawyers to advise their clients on ADR options.101 This view is endorsed by 
the Australian Law Reform Commission,102 the Law Council of Australia and 
in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice (2002),103
                                                 
95 Melissa Conley Tyler and Naomi Cukier argue that negotiation is a key skill for legal 
practice. See, eg, Melissa Conley Tyler and Naomi Cukier, ‘Nine Lessons for Teaching 
Negotiation Skills’ (2005) 15(1 & 2) Legal Education Review 61, 61. 
 which 
96 See Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2005 (Vic) r 12.1. 
97 See Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2005 (Vic) r 14.1. 
98 Gino Dal Pont, ‘Ethics: A Duty to Encourage Settlement’ (2005) 79(1-2) Law Institute 
Journal 80, 80.  
99 Boulle, above n 76. 
100 Macfarlane, above n 20, 22. 
101 David Spencer, ‘Liability of Lawyers to Advise on Alternative Dispute Resolution Options’ 
(1998) 9 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 292, 299.  
102 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 9. 
103 Rule 12.3 states that: A practitioner must where appropriate inform the client about the 
reasonably available alternatives to fully contested adjudication of the case unless the 
practitioner believes on reasonable grounds that the client already has such an understanding of 
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have been adopted by the representative bodies of legal practitioners in most 
Australian jurisdictions.104
A practitioner must where appropriate inform the client about the reasonably 
available alternatives to fully contested adjudication of the case unless the 
practitioner believes on reasonable grounds that the client already has such 
an understanding of those alternatives as to permit the client to make 
decisions about the clients’ best interests in relation to the litigation. 
 In Victoria, Rule 12.3 of the Professional Conduct 
and Practice Rules 2005 (Vic) states that:  
The integration of ADR concepts into legal practice and legal professional 
conduct regulation introduces an added layer of ethical challenges for the 
practitioner. These challenges arise from the non-adversarial, partnership 
approach of problem-solving courts, which rely on teamwork strategies 
devised not only by legal professionals, but by other professionals from a 
range of backgrounds.105 How does the ADR approach of collaborative 
problem solving fit in with the competitive strategy of the adversarial system? 
Will the ADR approach jeopardise a client’s chance of ‘winning’ the case and 
therefore ethically compromise the lawyer, or will it lead to a ‘better’ 
outcome?106
Simon explores the multi-layered conundrums that arise in defence counsel’s 
role in representing their clients in the therapeutic, community-centred milieu 
of the drug court. First, as zealous protagonist and guardian of a defendant’s 
legal rights, how does a defence lawyer best represent the best interests of the 
client as the client perceives these interests? Second, how does the defence 
lawyer reconcile the interests of the client with that of the community which 
is a key stakeholder in problem-solving courts? Furthermore, how does 
defence counsel best advise clients with respect to privacy issues and the 
possible erosion of the client’s rights when the client enters into treatment 
programs and makes commitments to undergo screening and various other 
procedures and interventions into their life? Finally, Simon asserts that 
 What does ‘better’ mean? Does it mean ‘better’ in terms of a 
client’s legal rights or does it mean ‘better’ in the holistic sense of taking into 
account the personal needs, wants, desires and concerns of the individual 
client, their family, all dispute stakeholders and the community?  
                                                                                                                    
those alternatives as to permit the client to make decisions about the clients’ best interests in 
relation to the litigation. 
104 For example, Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, Australian Capital Territory and 
Northern Territory.  
105 Freiberg ‘Non-Adversarial Approaches to Criminal Justice’, above n 73, 216.  
106 Scott R Peppet, ‘ADR Ethics’ (2004) 54 Journal of Legal Education 1, 72-8.  
   2009                                                                                    Non-Adversarial Justice 
 
 
 
45 
45 
problem solving courts actually put defence lawyers in the position where 
they co-operate and collude with the state.107
If Simon’s last mentioned assertion has merit, a real tension arises between 
ethical tenets laid down by the Victorian legislature in its delegated legislation 
governing professional conduct and the nature, composition and processes of 
problem-solving courts. Defence counsel have traditionally been expected and 
even encouraged to robustly advocate for their clients, putting their client’s 
position in the best possible light before the court. In Victoria, rule 12.1 of the 
Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2005 states that  
  
[a] practitioner must seek to advance and protect the client’s interests to the 
best of the practitioner’s skill and diligence, uninfluenced by the 
practitioner’s personal view of the client or the client’s activities, and 
notwithstanding any threatened unpopularity or criticism of the practitioner 
or any other person, and always in accordance with the law including these 
rules.  
The Victorian Bar Rules echo these principles of professional conduct108 
which are founded on the recognition of the power imbalance that necessarily 
exists when defendants confront the mighty resources of the state and the 
serious consequences associated with criminal conviction. Similarly, cases 
such as Tuckiar v The King109 underline the unique nature of the criminal 
defence lawyer’s duty to the client, including the duty of confidentiality. In 
Tuckiar110
Running parallel to the rise of ADR is the erosion of the traditional 
paternalistic role of professionals generally in relation to their clients/patients. 
Whereas, historically, professionals such as lawyers and doctors were 
empowered by their expertise and perceived status to conduct professional 
practice in an authoritarian manner, in recent times there has been a marked 
cultural shift. The culture of consumerism and the demands of litigation 
brought by clients/patients against professionals have contributed to 
 a majority of the High Court of Australia held that defence counsel 
was not entitled to divulge to the court a communication by the client 
including the confession of guilt to a murder charge. Clearly, these common 
law and legislative principles are at odds with the open, non-adversarial team-
based approach taken in problem-solving courts. 
                                                 
107 William H Simon, ‘Criminal Defenders and Community Justice: The Drug Court Example’ 
(2003) 40 American Criminal Law Review 1595, 1603. 
108 Victorian Bar, Practice Rules: Rules of Conduct& Compulsory Continuing Legal Education 
Rules (2005) pt 11. 
109 (1934) 52 CLR 335 (‘Tuckiar’). 
110 Ibid. 
DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                              VOLUME 14 NO 1 
 
 
 
46 
46 
professional practice being increasingly sensitive to notions such as ‘shared 
decision-making’.111 Dal Pont considers that the rise of consumerism has 
‘heralded … a marked decrease in client loyalty and a willingness to question 
the once unquestionable’.112 Using Hodges’ Foucaultian discourse paradigm, 
there is a sense that the lawyer/client relationship discourse is shifting from a 
lawyer-driven discourse to one which is client-driven.113 The trend accords 
with the client empowerment model that underlies ADR theory and practice114
Problem-solving courts challenge traditional stereotypes of legal 
representation.
 
and is exemplified by legal practice realities such as the ‘unbundling’ of legal 
services described above.  
115 Their nature, composition, workings and theoretical bases 
raise practice issues for legal practitioners. Douglas argues that therapeutic 
justice practices blur the boundaries between the healing and welfare 
professions and the legal profession.116
Fiss, writing in the 1980s, during the ADR insurgence into the judicial 
institutions of the USA, dismisses proponents of ADR on the basis of a 
spurious argument that settlement of disputes through ADR processes is not 
‘preferable to judgment’ and therefore should not be ‘institutionalised on a 
wholesale and indiscriminate basis’.
 For example, in the Drug Courts the 
overlap between the court process, mental health concerns and substance 
abuse issues is palpable. In this holistic context, how competent are legal 
practitioners in representing their clients when representation includes 
negotiating outcomes based on improving the health and social function of 
their client, the drug user?  
117
                                                 
111 See Judy Gutman, ‘The Right Not to Know: Patient Autonomy or Medical Paternalism’ 
(2000) 7 Journal of Law and Medicine 286, 290.  
 Fiss’ analysis of ADR-prompted 
settlement and the adjudicative process is flawed as it fails to adequately 
distinguish between adjudication and ADR. Fiss argues that settlements 
reached by parties through ADR processes are akin to plea bargaining. That 
is, ADR settlements are prompted by coercion. In making this assertion, Fiss 
fails to consider a basic distinguishing feature of ADR, namely that ADR 
disputants are responsible for the outcome of the dispute. This empowering 
characteristic is important in both disputant compliance and satisfaction with 
112 Gino Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility (3rd ed, 2006) 12.   
113 Brian Hodges, ‘Medical Education and the Maintenance of Incompetence’ (2006) 28(8) 
Medical Teacher 690, 691.  
114 Boulle, above n 76, 224.  
115 Andrew Goldsmith, Mark Israel and Kathleen Daly (eds), Crime and Justice: A Guide to 
Criminology (3rd ed, 2006) 455. 
116 Douglas, above n 22. 
117 Owen M Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ (1984) 93(6) The Yale Law Journal 1073, 1075.  
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settlements reached via ADR processes.118 Further, Fiss ignores the all-
important roles of the third party in both adjudication and ADR. In 
adjudication, the outcome is determined solely by the adjudicator according to 
legal rights and rules of procedure and evidence. By contrast, the ADR neutral 
third party has input into the ADR process only as facilitator. The content and 
outcome of the dispute, including the settlement, belong to the disputants.119 
The facilitative mediation process is based on the philosophy of party self 
determination which is enhanced by the problem-solving focus of the 
process.120
Fiss generalises about ADR, failing to distinguish between the various 
processes that comprise the ADR spectrum. This generalisation leads him to 
come to over-simplistic and uninformed conclusions. The kernel of Fiss’ 
argument is based on the erroneous assertion that ADR processes are 
settlement-driven and, consequently, that ADR processes necessarily lead to 
settlements that may result in poor socio-legal outcomes.
 
121
Another of Fiss’ criticisms of ADR is based on power imbalance. Whilst it is 
acknowledged that disputant inequalities based on socio-economic grounds 
culture, gender, geography and education affect power dynamics in ADR 
processes, these factors are serious issues in traditional dispute resolution 
processes also. Access to justice remains a key issue in the justice system 
overall.
 This point of view 
does not take into account how the costs and stresses associated with litigation 
can drive parties to settle on inequitable terms. This fundamental error, and 
Fiss’ defective reasoning in bundling all ADR processes together, detract 
from the validity of his criticisms of ADR.  
122
Another practice concern goes to the very heart of the many and varied duties 
of the lawyer, duties whose fulfilment is a measure of responsible professional 
practice. Central among these duties is the practitioner’s duty to engage in 
 Speedier outcomes, the lower costs associated with ADR, and its 
less formal, less rigid and less legalistic format enhance the potential for 
access to justice and thereby diminish, rather than exacerbate, problems 
caused by power imbalances. 
                                                 
118 See Strang et al, above n 89, 291. See also, ‘Four Stories of the Mediation Process’ referred 
to by Baruch Bush and Folger, above n 33, 9 and Baruch Bush, above n 25, 1. 
119 Donna Cooper and Rachael Field, ‘The Family Dispute Resolution of Parenting Matters in 
Australia (2008) 8(1) Law and Justice Journal 158, 165. 
120 Ibid. 
121 For example, settlement is not the goal of the transformative mediation model. 
122 See Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, Law and Poverty in 
Australia: Second Main Report (1975). 
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legal practice in a competent manner. The legal practitioner’s professional 
responsibility originates from threefold obligations123 founded on contract 
law,124 tort law125 and the law of equity in relation to fiduciary duties.126 
Competence is an implied term in the retainer for legal services between 
lawyer and client. The notion of competence in legal practice is enshrined in 
the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) which provides an inclusive definition of 
unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct.127
A barrister must act honestly, fairly and with competence and diligence in 
the service of a client and should accept instructions and a retainer to act for 
a client only when the barrister can reasonably expect to serve the client in 
that manner and attend to the work required with reasonable promptness. 
 In 
connection with legal practice, unsatisfactory professional conduct includes 
conduct falling short of the standard of competence and diligence expected by 
a member of the public. Professional misconduct includes failure to reach or 
maintain a reasonable standard of competence. Similarly, the Professional 
Conduct and Practice Rules 2005 (Vic) are prefaced by the underlying 
principle that ‘[p]ractitioners should serve their clients competently and 
diligently’. The importance of competency is again underscored by the 
introductory principles to the Advocacy and Litigation Rules (Vic) which state 
that ‘[p]ractitioners … should act with competence, honesty and candour’ and 
the general principles of professional conduct spelt out in the Victorian Bar 
rules. Here, rule 3 states that: 
The standard of competent legal practice is determined by peer professional 
opinion as set out in legislative provisions that do not consider legal practice 
specifically, but pertain to professional practice generally.128 Practice 
standards are measured by yardsticks set by a significant number of respected 
practitioners in the field.129 In the context of legal professional practice, ‘the 
relevant standard of care is that of … a qualified, competent and careful 
lawyer in the given circumstances in the practice of’130 their profession. This 
would mean ‘that a lawyer is expected to possess the knowledge held by the 
reasonably competent lawyer of well-settled principles of law and the relevant 
procedures and rules of court applicable to the client’s needs’.131
                                                 
123 Mary Anne Noone, ‘Lawyers as Mediators: More Responsibility?’ (2006) 17 Australasian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 96, 101. 
 A lawyer 
124 Ysaiah Ross, Ethics in Law (4th ed, 2005), 296.  
125 See Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC 465. 
126 See Astley v Austrust Limited (1999) 197 CLR 1.   
127 Ss 4.4.2 and 4.4.3.  
128 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 59. 
129 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 59(1); Twidale v Bradley [1990] 2 Qd R 464, 482. 
130 Dal Pont, above n 113, 115. 
131 Ibid 116. 
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cannot contract out of the standard of care.132 The standard of care cannot be 
reduced due to a lawyer’s inexperience, their lack of specialisation, their 
acting pro bono or in a legally aided matter or because of the location of their 
practice.133 Whilst problem-solving courts, relying on principles of restorative 
justice and therapeutic jurisprudence, require lawyers to appreciate the health 
and welfare ramifications of their client’s case, how much knowledge and 
expertise relating to non- legal aspects of practice in problem-solving 
jurisdictions will be expected of the reasonably competent lawyer?134 
Arguably, the discourse of legal competence is changing.135 Traditionally, 
peer professional standards applied to both the ‘client warrior’ and ‘officer of 
the court’ discourses. The ‘new lawyer’136 discourse, incorporating conflict 
resolution advocacy, consensus seeking, experimentation and innovation,137
Problem-solving courts also challenge traditional notions concerning the role 
of the judiciary as independent, impartial and neutral arbiters of disputes, and 
referees of the adversarial contest.
 
may be more applicable in the twenty first century, and accreditation 
standards relating to legal practitioners need to be modified accordingly. 
138 Fox remarks that specialist tribunals 
such as Drug Courts introduce the European civil law concept of ‘magistrate 
as investigator’ and he predicts that this judicial role will become 
‘increasingly attractive’ in Australia.139
the doctrine of separation of powers and … the importance attached by the 
High Court in the case of Kable to judges not being placed in the position of 
appearing to be doing the bidding of the executive arm of government.
 Fox also notes the tensions exposed 
on the one hand by an inquisitorial magistrate in a problem-solving court and, 
on the other hand,  
140
According to Simon, problem-solving courts are based on the shared interests 
and norms of all stakeholders.
  
141 The model accepted by personnel in these 
courts is one of collaborative ‘team relationships’.142
                                                 
132 Ibid 118. 
 Defendants can expect 
133 See Yates Property Corp v Boland (1998) 85 FCR 84, 105. 
134 Dal Pont, above n 113, 115. 
135 See Hodges, above n 113, 691. 
136 See Macfarlane, above n 20, 22.  
137 Simon, above n 108, 1595. 
138 See Goldsmith, above n 116, 455. See also John Kleinig, Ethics and Criminal Justice: An 
Introduction (2008) 155. 
139 Richard Fox, ‘New Crimes or New Responses?: Future Directions in Australian Criminal 
Law’ (2002) 28 Monash University Law Review 103, 119.  
140 Ibid 119, citing Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
141 Simon, above n 108, 1596.  
142 Ibid. 
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leniency and welfare services. Judges are more active and ‘managerial’ and 
prosecutors and defence counsel are ‘less distant from the judge and each 
other’.143 The expanded role of the judiciary in problem-solving courts seems 
to fly in the face of traditional notions of judicial independence that are 
central to the Australian democratic process and its institutions.144
Goldsmith compares the active approach of magistrates in problem-solving 
courts to that of coach.
 
145 In the problem-solving court process, judges 
‘coach’ offenders to become law abiding citizens.146 Because of the 
interventionist function of magistrates in problem-solving courts, these 
jurisdictions necessarily rely on judicial support and co-operation.147 
Interestingly, the more active role of the judiciary in problem-solving courts 
arguably ‘places more control on the judge [or other decision-maker]’ in the 
sense that the judge is in a position to coach the defendants and tell them what 
to do.148
 
 This feature runs counter to the disputant-empowerment model that 
comprises a vital thread running through the fabric of traditional ADR theory.  
VI CONCLUSION 
 
The changes spearheaded by the growth and acceptance of ADR theory and 
practices in Australia, incorporating notions of restorative and therapeutic 
justice, have, in many areas of law and in many jurisdictions, necessitated 
changes to court processes and to the roles of lawyers and judges. The trend 
appears to be in the direction of non-adversarial, participatory court 
procedures, with judges having an expanded function. The traditional model 
of lawyering, the hired gun client advocate, is no longer appropriate in all 
courts and jurisdictions. Contemporary best practice lawyering recognises the 
important and ‘new’ role of lawyers as problem solvers, working 
collaboratively, often in a multidisciplinary environment. Their aim is to 
achieve consensus, an outcome that is beneficial to all stakeholders in the 
dispute, and a result that has a positive effect on both the legal profession and 
the community and also promotes confidence in the justice system. Although 
the ‘new’ roles of judges and lawyers have been lauded by state and federal 
                                                 
143 Ibid. 
144 See Michael C Dorf and Jeffrey A Fagan, ‘Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to 
Institutionalization’ (2003) 40 American Criminal Law Review 1501, 1509. 
145 Goldsmith, above n 116, 455. See also Daicoff, above n 19, 4. 
146 Goldsmith, ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Seligman, Verkuil and Kang, above n 54, 62.  
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governments, the nuances of the associated ethical issues confronting 
Australian legal practitioners seem to have been overlooked by the reformers. 
As Mr Hulls points out, again stressing the importance of recognising and 
adapting to change,  
[p]eople generally realise that the reform train has well and truly left the 
station, and you are either on it, or you are left behind at the station, … [a]nd 
most people want to be on the train.149
Whilst catching the train is certainly important, careful preparation for the 
journey ahead must not be ignored. The starting point for lawyers’ 
groundwork necessarily involves the law school. Legal education needs to 
inculcate the new consensus-building framework of lawyering into law 
curricula, and provide students with the relevant knowledge and skills set.
  
150
                                                 
149 James Eyers, ‘Vic Allots More Funds for Justice’, The Australian Financial Review 
(Melbourne), 9 May 2008, 51. 
 
Furthermore, legal regulators and accreditors as well as legislators must 
recognise the changing face of legal practice and cater for the challenges 
facing practitioners, especially those practising in problem-solving courts.  
150 For a discussion of ADR in law schools see Gutman, above n 8. See also Kathy Douglas, 
‘Shaping the Future: The Discourses of ADR and Legal Education’ (2008) 8(1) Law and 
Justice Journal 118, 118. 
